We present a prototype system developed in cooperation with a business organization that combines information visualization and pattern-matching techniques to detect fraudulent activity by employees. The system is built upon common fraud patterns searched while trying to detect occupational fraud suggested by internal auditors of a business company. The main visualization of the system consists of a multi-layer radial drawing that represents the activity of the employees and clients. Each layer represents a different examined pattern whereas heat-maps indicating suspicious activity are incorporated in the visualization. The data are first preprocessed based on a decision tree generated by the examined patterns and each employee is assigned a value indicating whether or not there exist indications of fraud. The visualization is presented as an animation and the employees are visualized one by one according to their severity values together with their related clients.
INTRODUCTION
Internal fraud detection gains more and more attention as fraudulent activity appears in ascendant trend during the last years. Fraud is defined as "the intentional misuse or abuse of the assets of a company (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012)" and may be committed by employees, clients or other entities. Studies on business fraud show that most of the reported fraud cases have been committed by trusted associates and this is referred to as "occupational or employee fraud". Such schemes may continue for years until fraud is confirmed, producing a huge cost both to the global economy and to the company. As a result of fraud, business reputation, company value and public and client trust are negatively affected.
Even though advanced information technology has been incorporated into organizations to reduce the risk of internal fraud, monitoring diverse systems that produce textual logs in non-uniform formats is a time-consuming task. Information visualization can be promising, since it facilitates the quick identification of fraudulent activity. In this paper, we present a system developed in cooperation with a business organization that exploits the advantages of information visualization and pattern recognition to detect suspicious patterns concerning fraudulent financial statements in systems in which a pair of entities (employee and client) are involved. Towards this direction, the system produces a multi-layer radial drawing (see Fig. 1 ) representing the activity of employees and clients along with other significant information that enable the identification of possible fraud patterns.
Since occupational fraud schemes are well-hidden in the huge amount of data, we were seeking for an approach that would present to the auditor all the recorded events according to their severity. On the other hand, visualizing large data-sets simultaneously is confusing and inefficient. For this reason, the system measures the similarity of the activity of the employees based on fraud detection patterns (suggested by auditors based on their experience and the framework of the company on internal fraud risk reduction) and appropriate heat-maps are generated and incorporated in the system. The produced visualization is presented as an animation. The system supports supplementary functionalities such as a database log viewer, export log mechanisms, storing and post-processing of data, plots and charts.
RELATED WORK
Fraud detection has been studied enough in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, there exist only few works oriented exclusively on occupational fraud detection. Luell (Luell, 2010) utilizes datamining and visualization techniques to detect client advisor fraud in a financial institution. Eberle and Holder (Eberle and Holder, 2009 ) detect structural anomalies in transactions and processes propagated by employees using a graph representation. SynerScope (SynerScope, 2011) is an industrial tool capable of detecting financial fraud using a visualization scheme similar to ours representing the billing links and relations between the company and other entities. The main difference is that our system is oriented on occupational fraud detection based on patterns suggested by auditors and, thus, it is equipped with a detection mechanism that preprocesses the data and the visualization conforms to these patterns. We also utilize animations to avoid cluttering the visualization. A visualization system based on concentric circles was presented in aiming at identifying periodic events using an algorithm for periodicity detection. Our system extends the one presented in (Argyriou et al., 2013a ) that detects periodic patterns that may conceal occupational fraud in several ways: (i) The visualization of our system provides a complete view of all the examined patterns and the results of the examination on each pattern (in (Argyriou et al., 2013a) , the detection procedure was a "black-box" determining the order of the presentation of the clients in a video representing their activity in which suspicious clients appeared first; partial results of the detection procedure were illustrated in additional plots and charts, which hindered the investigation), (ii) the detection mechanism is based on a decision tree even though we have incorporated most of the patterns presented in (Argyriou et al., 2013a) , (iii) for periodicity detection, we apply a variation of the Longest Common Subsequence algorithm (Vlachos et al., 2003) that tackles noisy data, (iv) a parallel coordinates plot has been added to detect unusual employee behavior, (v) the system provides a database-viewer to facilitate the investigation procedure. Many of the existing works on fraud detection in general, use data-mining (Bolton and Hand, 2002) , (Kou et al., 2004) , (Phua et al., 2010) and pattern matching or graph pattern matching approaches (Senator et al., 1995) , (Senator et al., 2002) , (Wolverton et al., 2003) . Visualizations have also been used for financial crime detection (Chang et al., 2008) , (Huang et al., 2009) , (Giacomo et al., 2010) , (Didimo et al., 2011) , (Didimo et al., 2012) . For details on the above works refer to (Argyriou et al., 2013b) . This paper is structured as follows: In Section 3, we describe the detection procedure. In Section 4, we present the features of the visualization. Section 5 presents a casestudy based on real data. We conclude in Section 6 with open problems and future work.
As input, the system takes log files from diverse control systems that are appropriately parsed and stored in a database using a uniform format. Records may be generated by systems involving an employee and a client consist (among other secondary fields) of a time-stamp, an employee ID, a client ID and an action. An event, say e, is defined as a 4-tuple (t, u, c, a) , where: (i) t corresponds to the time-stamp of the occurrence of e, (ii) u corresponds to an employee, (iii) c represents a client, and (iv) a is the action taken by the employee. For an event e = (t, u, c, a), we say that client c is related to e and is also related to employee u. For a pair of employee-client (u, c), an event-series T u,c = {e 1 (u,c) , e 2 (u,c) , . . .} is a sequence of events e i (u,c) = (t i , u, c, a i ) related to client c and employee u.
The visualization may be generated either based on the whole data-set of the database or on queries performed by the auditor in the startup screen of the system. As mentioned above, data have to be preprocessed before producing the visualization such that employees with strong indication of fraud are distinguished. For this reason, for a given employee u, the event-series with each related client will be evaluated based on fraud patterns and a value indicating the severity of the related events (within range [0, 1]) will be assigned first to the event-series and then, to the employee. If several fraud patterns are identified, employee u is assigned the maximum severity value of the already calculated event-series related to u. The evaluation is performed based on a decision tree generated by the following patterns suggested by the auditors (see Fig. 2 ): (i) There exist more than X events related to employee u and client c within a time interval of Y days/months where X,Y are configurable by the auditor (refer to the green rectangular node of the first layer below the root of the decision tree in Fig. 2 ), (ii) the employee has performed unauthorized actions (based on a list of actions provided by the auditors) and, (iii) the employee operated in systems that she is not authorized to use. In the case where patterns (ii) or (iii) occur, the event-series of the employee is assigned the maximum value (i.e., value 1) such that the employee is definitely distinguished in the visualization. However, in the case where pattern (i) occurs, the investigation has to proceed further. Then, the patterns that are taken into consideration are:
• Event-series periodicity: A common pattern while examining such fraud schemes is the occurrence of events in regular time basis. For instance, an employee modifies intentionally the account of a client every month within the billing cycle of the account and more precisely, before its billing date. Assuming that event-series T u,c related to employee u and client c is ordered according to the time-stamps of the events, the system aims to detect similarities between pattern time-series based on a variation of Longest Common Subsequence algorithm (Vlachos et al., 2003) , which is robust under noisy conditions. The pattern timeseries include the ideal time-series if the events between the entities appear in time intervals that equal exactly to 1, 7, 15, 30 and other time-series identified in the past as fraud patterns. In the case where similarity with any of the above time-series is detected, we consider the event-series of the employee to be periodical.
• Events occurring outside working hours: Fraudulent activities usually occur outside working hours, on holidays or at the end of the employee's shift. For this reason, if such events occur they have to be taken under consideration.
• Employee's frequency in recorded systems: Each employee according to her responsibilities operates in specific business systems. If this is not the case, then the employee has to justify the recorded event. Also, in several systems such as fraud management systems (FMS), it is expected that an employee monitors the activity of a suspicious client. Hence, events stemming from these systems have to be given smaller weight.
• Actions taken by the employee: Similarly to the previous case, there exist some actions that an employee is unlikely, but not unauthorized to perform since they do not conform to her duties.
The idea behind the decision tree was to correspond to each layer one fraud pattern and create a path according to the result of the examination on each pattern. We consider the importance of patterns based on their corresponding layer in the decision tree, such that the higher ones (closer to the root) are more important. Let
be the pattern vector examined (e.g., x = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0] corresponds to non-fraudulent activity) and let y = [y 1 ,..., y 5 ] be the vector resulting from the traversal of the decision tree from its root to its leaves according to the evaluation of the events of pair (u, c) on each factor. If the examination of the events leads to "Unauthorized action" or "Unauthorized system" the event-series is directly assigned value 1. Else, each tree layer i is assigned a weight, say w i , i = 1, . . . , 5, based on the formula presented in (Stillwell et al., 1981) such that dissimilarities between the two vectors that occur at higher levels of the tree will be more important. For this reason, the distance be- tween vectors x, y, say d(x, y), representing the dissimilarity by the pattern vector, is calculated by applying the normalized Weighted Euclidean Distance met-
This value (or the maximum of the already calculated values, if more than one fraud patterns exist) corresponds to the severity value of the event-series of employee u, which is the value finally assigned to the employee. Based on these values the system generates a heat-map representing all employees by rectangular nodes and gradient colors from blue to red (refer to the upper-left heat-map of Fig. 1 ), such that nodes with color close to color-red represent employees with strong indications of fraud, whereas blue colored nodes employees with no suspicion of fraud. Similarly to the severity calculation of the event-series of employees, the system assigns also a severity value to clients based on the above patterns. The only difference is that for a given client c, the severity value is calculated on all the events related to c (not only the ones that concern a specific employee). In this manner, a client involved in suspicious activity with two or more employees will be distinguished.
FEATURES OF THE SYSTEM
The visualization window 1 consists of two heat-maps representing the severity of the activity of employees and clients (refer to Panels #1 and #2 of Fig. 1, resp. ). Due to space constraints, details about the selection of the particular type of color-maps can be found in (Argyriou et al., 2013b) . At startup only the heat-map representing the activity of the employees is gener-1 The reader is suggested to print the paper in color.
ated. The auditor selects a threshold value that determines the employees that will be presented based on their severity values. The visualization is animated and each time an employee together with her related clients is illustrated. Before an employee is presented, the heat-map for her related clients is generated. The main visualization of the system is a multi-layer radial drawing where each layer L 1 ,..., L 5 (see Fig. 3 ) represents a different aspect of the audit data (systems, actions, within working hours or not, periodicity) and each circular sector corresponds to an entity (employee, client or cluster). Then, a graph is generated; its nodes correspond to each of the above entities, whereas its edges correspond to the connections among them. The innermost layer of the visualization (layer L 1 of Fig. 3 ) accommodates the nodes of the graph (drawn as portions of a ring). Nodes representing employees are drawn to the left-part of the visualization where the ones representing their related clients to the right part. To avoid cluttering the visualization with nodes representing clients with no indication of fraud, the auditor can specify thresholds that split clients in one or two clusters (low-severity cluster and/or medium-severity cluster) according to their severity values. These nodes are accommodated on top and to the bottom part of the visualization. The color of the nodes (apart from the ones representing clusters and the gray-colored ones that will be explained later) follows the color of the corresponding entities in the heat-maps. The light-blue (green, resp) colored cluster-node corresponds to the low (medium, resp) severity cluster (refer to reference points 1 and 2 of Fig. 3, resp. ). Regarding the edges of the drawing, the system supports either circular arc edges or straight-line edges. The thickness of an edge is proportional to the number of connections between the employee and the client while its color is determined by the color of the client. In a fraud context, "fat" edges (unless referring to cluster nodes) and in particular, the red-colored ones may be indications of fraud that have to be further examined.
Subsequent layers (i.e., layers L 2 − L 5 ) represent the patterns described in Section 3 and are split into two regions A and B (refer to Fig. 3) . Region A represents a heat-map indicating the result of the examination of the entity in the specific pattern. Red color indicates identification of suspicious pattern. Region B illustrates information about each corresponding examined pattern. In layer L 2 , the different business systems related to the each of the entities are represented. Each such system is characterized by a specific color and occupies space proportional to the corresponding aggregate percentage of use by the entity. For each employee, this percentage is calculated based on the aggregated percentage of use on all clients that are currently drawn in the visualization, whereas for each client based on the percentage of use by the employee currently visualized (unless more than one employees related to a client are drawn simultaneously in the visualization). Similarly, for cluster nodes the aggregated percentage of use for all clients that belong to the cluster is calculated. Systems for which the employee is an unauthorized or not a frequent user are marked by an X (refer to reference point 3 of Fig. 3 ).
Layer L 3 corresponds to the actions reported for each entity, and are drawn in a similar manner as the ones in layer L 2 . Again unauthorized or suspicious actions are marked with an X. Layer L 4 represents the percentage of events that occur within or outside working hours. The light-blue colored parts represent events occurring within working hours, whereas the light-red colored parts indicate the existence of events occurring outside working hours (e.g., see reference points 4 and 5 of Fig. 3, resp) . For each client node there exists an additional layer (refer to L 5 of Fig. 3 , e.g., see reference point 6) that indicates whether or not the event-series of the client is periodical. The event-series is compared with the pattern time-series stored in the system and a heat-map is generated indicating the degree of similarity with each pattern. Again, light-red colors indicate suspicious cases.
Regarding the investigation procedure, as already mentioned the auditor specifies a threshold and the employees with assigned severity value above the threshold are presented with their related clients in the visualization one by one. The auditor is able to start, pause or stop the video and process the visualization. In the case where a client node is selected, additional related employees can be added to the visualization, which facilitates the possible identification of two or more employees that may cooperate in committing fraud (the case where an employee node is selected is treated similarly). In Fig. 3 , gray colored nodes (see reference point 7) represent nodes added during post-processing when a client node is selected (refer to the node pointed by the green arrow of Fig. 3) . If more than one node representing employees exist simultaneously in the visualization, the auditor is able to select one of them and add the related employees to the visualization. Gray-color is utilized for non-selected employee nodes together with their edges and related clients (if they are not related also to the selected employee) to avoid distracting the auditor. In the case where a cluster node is selected, the corresponding rectangles in the heatmap representing clients are marked with an X such that they can be added (if desired) to the visualization. However, the system permits a specific number of additions of employee or client nodes in order to avoid cluttering the visualization area. If this number is exceeded, optionally a new visualization can be produced, where only the inner-most layer of the radial drawing (i.e., the one corresponding to the clients and employees) is drawn along with the relations between them. Again, the width of the edges is proportional to the number of events that relate two entities. In the case where further investigation is needed the auditor selects the desired node (which becomes larger) and the other layers of the radial drawing (i.e., L 2 − L 5 ) that correspond to the particular node appear in the visualization. In this manner, the system is able to visualize simultaneously a larger set of entities and reveal the relations between them. However, this may slow down the investigation and for this reason, we adopted the animation approach and the simultaneous visualization of all layers for each node. Due to space constraints, details about the ordering of the nodes in the visualization can be found in (Argyriou et al., 2013b) .
Panel #4 of Fig. 1 accommodates a time-line plot representing the event-series for the selected pair of entities (refer to the blue series), where the x−axis corresponds to the date of the occurrence of each event and the y−axis to the number of events occurred during the specific date. The red series represents the billing date of the account of the specific client for each month. This plot facilitates the identification of possible periodic activity especially close to the billing date of the account of the client. In employee fraud schemes, it is also possible that the event-series related to a pair of entities is periodical only based on a specific action. For this reason, we have incorporated in the system a second plot (refer to Panel #5 of Fig. 1 ) that presents all reported actions by distinct series. In this plot, the y−axis corresponds to the day Figure 3 : Description of the main-visualization of the system. "Fat" edges (unless referring to cluster nodes) and in particular, the red-colored ones may be indications of fraud that have to be further examined. of the month that event x related to a specific action occurred (e.g., the first event related to an action that occurred on the 15th day of a month will be drawn on point (1, 15). For this case, we ignore multiple occurrences of events related to the same action occurred the same day of the month. In the case where periodicity occurs for a specific action, the corresponding series will have part (or the whole series) almost parallel to x−axis.
The system supports also mechanisms to detect patterns of unusual employee behavior such as unauthorized access to computers, business systems and accounts of employees or clients by producing a parallel coordinates plot (see Fig. 4 ). In this case, each record consists of an employee, a time-stamp, an IP indicating the address of the employee's computer, a computer name and an action (i.e., login, login failure, etc). The size of the nodes and the edges is proportional to the number of their occurrences in the database. The nodes on each layer are ordered by their number of occurrences in the data-set. The patterns commonly used in this scenario are: (i) More than X failed login attempts within a time interval of Y days/months, where X,Y are configurable by the auditor, and (ii) Login attempts or failed login attempts occurring from different IPs and/or computer names.
CASE STUDY
We present the results of the evaluation of the system on real data-sets stemming from two control systems of a business company. All data provided to us were anonymous for data privacy reasons. The dataset consists of 180.637 entries lying within a time interval of six months. The data-set consists of 710 distinct employees and 83.030 distinct clients. The auditors have also included a set of entries corresponding to a "fictional" fraud case scenario in which an employee modifies the account of a client. We were not communicated any information regarding the billing dates of the accounts of the clients.
Since one of the data-sets stems from a fraud management system, it is expected that reoccurring activity between the same pair of employee and client will occur (a "suspicious" client is expected to be supervised by an employee). For this reason, we concentrated our study in identifying pairs of employees and clients that appear to have more that 10 related events and occur in regular time basis, and in particular, monthly. The employees' heat-map indicated 41 employees that were related with the same client with more than 10 events. Among these employees, 17 of them had periodic activity and events occurring outside working hours (the corresponding rectangles in the employees' heat-map were "close to" color-red), while the remaining 24 employees had events occurring outside working hours (the corresponding rectangles in the employees' heat-map were "close to" color-orange). Also, no employee used unauthorized systems or actions, whereas only one employee had used non common actions.
Due to space constraints, we will only present the "fictional" fraud case. A detailed description of the case study can be found in (Argyriou et al., 2013b) . In Fig. 5 , Employee-40 is related to Client-6 with more than 10 events, using two business systems for which she is a frequent user and common actions (see reference points 1 and 2 of Fig. 5 ; the parts representing the systems and the actions are not marked by an X, which implies that the user was frequent for the specific systems or had performed common actions, and the corresponding heat-maps are blue-colored; see reference points 3 and 4 of Fig. 5 ). All the events that related these entities occurred within working hours (see reference point 5 of Fig. 5) . However, the eventseries of Employee-40 appears to have strong similarity with six fraud pattern time-series, including the one that corresponds to periodicity of one month, which is represented by the first heat-map of the each periodicity layer (see reference point 6 of Fig. 5 ). Also, Client-6 was not related to any other employee (when selected, no other employee was added to the visualization). All other clients related to Employee-40, where placed in the low-severity cluster, whereas no client was placed in the medium-severity cluster (see reference points 7 and 8 of Fig. 5, resp. ). The first suspicions according to the auditors, are raised by the fact that there exists activity between the two entities stemming from two business systems.
The auditors explained that the time-line plot (refer to Fig. 6 ) matches to a fraud case scenario according to which there exists some activity at the beginning (between April -May) with no specific periodicity and then, appears periodic activity (from May to September). In the first time interval, the fraudster is trying to organize her fraud by performing a number of actions. Once the fraud is organized, only periodic actions are required. Another suspicious observation is that the events from May to September occur close to the same dates of each month (from 10th to 15th). Of course, there exist some "noisy" data that have to be excluded in order to understand the fraud pattern. These may have been caused either on purpose to cover up the fraud or were part of the duties of the employee. The above assumption is reinforced by the plot of Fig. 7 which reveals the periodic occurrence of each performed action. For instance, "Action 101" (see reference point 1) appears to have periodicity around the 15th day of the month from its second occurrence and later. Also, "Action 107" (see reference point 2) appears to have periodicity around the 11th-13th day of the month from its third occurrence and later. In particular, the vast majority of events are recorded between the 10th and the 15th day of the month. We could be more convinced that this case consists fraud if we knew exactly the billing cycle of the account of the client. In a similar manner, the frames of the animation illustrating the other highly-ranked employees were investigated. We gave more attention to the 17 frames of the animation containing periodic events. Fortunately for the company, the only real evidence of fraud existed in the fictional data added by the auditors. However, the auditors had not identified all these cases while examining the data-sets manually and they had to make an additional investigation.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented an integrated fraud management visualization system that aims to identify patterns that may conceal occupational fraud through a combination of pattern recognition and visualization. Our work opens several aspects for future work such as incorporation of more fraud patterns, use of more statistical methods and, extension of the system in order to identify more complicated fraud schemes (client fraud, telecommunication fraud, etc.) in a wider variety of business systems.
